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How faster productivity growth in low-skill sectors contribute to
wage stagnation
Because productivity grows unevenly, workers reallocate between sectors, and
low-skill wages stagnate, write Rachel Ngai and Orhun Sevinc
The real wage of non-college workers in the U.S. has grown by about 20 per cent since the 1980s,
which is less than half of the growth in aggregate labour productivity. This is rather puzzling because
low-skill workers tend to work in sectors that have higher productivity growth, yet their wages are
lagging behind those of high-skill workers and aggregate labour productivity. The slow growth of low-
skill wages is also important for the average wage growth as non-college workers represent two-
thirds of employment since the 1980s. International data suggest more evidence on the stagnation in
low-skill wages. While starting years vary, low-skill wage stagnation is observed in some other OECD
countries after 1980. Recent research shows that there has been little pay progression for the less
educated workers in the UK.
Our research offers a novel perspective on low-skill wage stagnation, which also links it to growing
inequality and wage-productivity divergence. Our explanation rests on labour reallocation driven by
uneven productivity growth across sectors. When we take a deeper look into the low-skill labour
market using U.S. data, we observe that real wage, i.e., nominal wages deflated by the aggregate
consumption price index, grows similarly across workers in different sectors (left panel of Figure 1).
The growth rate of the wage with which workers enjoy consumption does not depend on what they
produce in the economy. However, looking at the growth rate of their product wages, i.e., nominal
wages deflated by the sectoral price of the output they produce, we see a quite dispersed pattern
reflecting large changes in relative prices. Sectors with rising relative prices are those with slower
growth in low-skill product wages. The product wage would be the exact measure of the marginal
product of labour—the increase in output after employing one more unit of labour— in a perfectly
competitive labour market. This observation can contribute to stagnation in aggregate low-skill real
wage because low-skill workers are reallocating into sectors with slower growth in product wages
(right panel of Figure 1).
Figure 1. Growth in low-skill real wage, product wage and hours shares by sector
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Notes: Growth rates for the period 1980-2010. Wage growth controls for the changing demographic and occupational structure.
How important is the mechanism highlighted in Figure 1 for low-skill wage stagnation? The aggregate
low-skill real wage can be expressed as a weighted average of sectoral product wages, where the
weight of a sector is a product of its relative price and the share of low-skill hours employed in the
sector. Figure 1 implies that the weights are increasing for sectors with rising relative prices.
Strikingly, Figure 2 shows that low-skill real wage growth would be more than double if these weights
were fixed at the 1980 levels. These facts are also confirmed with the U.S. state-level data.
Figure 2. A multisector perspective of low-skill real wage
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Notes: Wages normalised to 100 in 1980.  Wage growth controls for the changing demographic and occupational structure.
Our explanation builds on the observation that high-skill services, e.g. health and education, are
getting relatively more expensive over time and yet they are gaining a bigger share of the economy.
Low-skill workers are concentrated in sectors with faster productivity growth, but they do not benefit
as much because their output is getting cheaper over time and complement high-skill labour.
How does this play out? We can see it in a two-sector and two-input model, where (1) the high-skill
sector has slower productivity growth and uses high-skill worker more intensively (2) the output of the
two sectors are gross complements. These two elements together imply that both the relative prices
and employment share of the high-skill sector are growing over time. Intuitively, as consumers
demand both low-skill and high-skill product, slower productivity growth in the high-skill sector implies
more labour input is needed to satisfy consumer demand. Given that the expanding sector has a
faster growth in price, this reallocation process reflects a shift of workers into the sector with a slower
growing product wage, which cause the stagnation in the low-skill wage. The stagnation affects only
the low-skill wage because the high-skill sector puts a lower input weight on low-skill workers, so the
reallocation acts like a skill-biased demand shift which increases the relative wage of the high-skill
workers.
We can make the model more realistic with two additions: the introduction of capital and allowing for
changing production weights in the production function. These enable us to track the quantitative
importance of our mechanism against other sources of skill-biased demand shifts, such as capital-
skill complementarity and automation that displace low-skill workers.
Taking our model to the U.S. data, we observe that empirically, the divergence between productivity
and low-skill wage between 1980 and 2010 is largely accounted for by increasing wage inequality (70
per cent) and to a lower extent by falling labour share (20 per cent), and increasing relative cost of
living (10 per cent).
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Our mechanism can account for 68 per cent of the rise in wage inequality and the entire rise in the
relative cost of living. It is also an essential element in explaining low-skill wage stagnation as it can
generate sector-specific trends in the product wages of low-skill workers observed in the data.
Our results suggest that faster productivity growth in sectors that use low-skill workers intensively can
worsen labour market prospects for low-skill workers. However, there is room for policy to change
this. First, boosting the supply of high-skill workers through education policy can reduce wage
inequality as well as decreasing the employment share of the group that is most severely affected.
Second, supporting productivity growth in the high-skill sectors can slowdown the growth of their
relative prices, which mitigates the adverse consequences of the reallocation.
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Notes:
This blog post is based on A Multisector Perspective on Wage Stagnation.
The post expresses the views of its author(s), not the position of LSE Business Review or the
London School of Economics.
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